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ABSTRACT
Cross-border health challenges have led to innovative governance responses. No longer able
to go it alone, actors must coordinate their efforts with their partners. The 2009 outbreak of
swine influenza (H1N1), the earlier scare of avian influenza (H5N1), and the spread of severe
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003 forced themembers of theNorthAmerican Free Trade
Agreement to tackle health challenges. Officials, ministers, and leaders collaborated in an
effort to achieve a mutually beneficial outcome. These successive shocks, which struck with
increasing simultaneity and shared severity, raised trilateral cooperation higher, while North
American summitry sustained it.
Key words: global health governance, NAFTA, SARS, H1N1/swine flu, avian influenza, Security
and Prosperity Partnership/NorthAmerican Leaders Summit, Mexico, Canada, United States
RESUMEN
Los retos fronterizos de salud han llevado a los gobiernos a dar respuestas innovadoras. Como los
actores ya no pueden actuar solos, deben coordinar sus esfuerzos con sus socios. El brote de
influenza (H1N1) de 2009, el temor anterior que provocó la influenza aviar (H5N1) y la propa-
gación del síndrome respiratorio agudo severo (SARS) en 2003 forzaron a los miembros del Tra-
tado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte a abordar tales desafíos. Los funcionarios, los
ministros y los líderes colaboraron en un intento de lograr resultados mutuamente beneficiosos.
Estos shocks sucesivos, que golpearon con una creciente simultaneidad y severidad compartida,
elevaron los niveles de cooperación trilateral, mientras las reuniones cumbres los sustentaron.
Palabras claves: gobernanza en salud global, TLCAN, SARS, H1N1/influenza aviar, sociedad en
seguridad y prosperidad/Cumbre de Líderes de América del Norte, México, Canadá, Estados
Unidos
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INTRODUCTION
How far have Mexico, the United States, and Canada moved toward becoming a
single North American community for protecting public health since the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) formally came into force on January 1,
1994? This question has assumed compelling significance and timeliness with the
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) strike on Canada in the spring of 2003 and
the outbreak of influenza A(H1N1) –the so-called “swine flu”– in Mexico in April
2009, and its rapid spread to the United States, Canada, and the rest of the world.
By the end of January 2010, 209 countries had confirmed cases of H1N1, and at least
14 711 people had died as a result (World Health Organization [WHO], 2010). By
January 22, a reported 3 751 people had died in North America: 422 in Canada, 931
in Mexico, and 2 398 in the United States (Pan American Health Organization
[PAHO], 2010). Mexico had suffered serious economic costs as its vital tourism indus-
try dwindled and businesses and public facilities closed. Some estimated that for
every day of swine flu, Mexico lost approximately US$150 million. Former Mexican
Finance Minister Agustín Carstens described the impact of H1N1 as devastating for
tourism and costing “close to 0.3percent” of gross domestic product (GDP) or US$2.3
billion (Seegobin, 2009).
As 2010 began, officials in all three North American countries continued to be
apprehensive, anticipating that a third wave might come. Their fears were fuelled
by the memory of the deadly SARS that had killed 44 Canadians in Toronto in spring
2003 and the avian influenza that migrated around the world in the mid-2000s.
Various officials from the World Health Organization (WHO), the Pan American
Health Organization, and national health agencies continued to drive the concern
in January 2010 with reports and warnings of a possible third wave.
Within North America, the intergovernmental response to these successive
health challenges has changed. At the August 9-10, 2009 North American summit
in Guadalajara, Mexico, U.S. President Barack Obama, Mexican President Felipe Cal-
derón, and Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper gave themselves high marks
for their cooperative response to the swine flu threat. They proudly proclaimed in
their communiqué that “North America’s coordinated response to the initial out-
break of the H1N1 flu virus has proven to be a global example of cooperation” (North
American Leaders’ Summit, 2009a). They issued a separate statement on H1N1, the
first stand-alone statement on health from a NorthAmerican trilateral summit since
its start as an annual event in 2005, or even since North American summitry first
arose in 1956 (Swanson, 1975). But was this self-congratulation a symbol of real
enduring change, accompanied by an appropriate and adequate response to the
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clear compounding health challenge? Did it signal the culmination of an expanding
community-building process designed to address a broader array of threats to
the health of North Americans?
The limited scholarship thus far on this subject offers answers that divide into
four distinct schools of thought. The first suggests that emerging health challenges
have induced NAFTA countries not to cooperate (Price-Smith, 2009). Particular chal-
lenges, such as bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, or mad-cow disease), have
provided the NAFTA countries with an incentive to close their borders to their neigh-
bors, for fear that disease in one country could have an affect on their own citizens’
health. This was the case in May 2003 when both Mexico and the U.S. banned
Canadian cattle and beef after only one case of BSE had been discovered in Alberta.
National health has thus trumped efforts to promote more collaborative and coor-
dinated responses.
The second school suggests that the increased cooperation and coordination
expected after NAFTA have not occurred due to political, professional, legal, admin-
istrative, and cultural barriers that remained among the countries. There has been
no desire to overcome these barriers, and in many cases, incentives to keeping them
appear to exist (Homedes and Ugalde, 2003). Indeed, any harmonization in health
has been hindered by insufficient legal mechanisms to support crossborder collab-
oration, a lack of mutual respect among health professionals across countries, inad-
equate information sharing and direction setting on crossborder initiatives, and the
absence of any push to break down cultural barriers –including language barriers–
across the countries.
The third school argues that although NAFTA did not provide governments with
an incentive to cooperate on health, it did open up the opportunity and mobility for
convergence and crossover in the health sector (Appleton, 1999). Here, convergence
and crossover are highlighted cautiously, however, since the market incentives at
the forefront of NAFTA could cause a negative spillover into those systems that are
more highly prized at home than in neighboring countries.
The fourth school proposes that over time the North American partners have
increasingly collaborated on health due to the escalating frequency and severity of
health shocks that have hit the region hard and cannot be contained within the coun-
tries’ respective borders (Kirton and Guebert, 2010). Diseases that do not respect
borders, such as SARS, have highlighted the need for North America to cooperate and
coordinate on health prevention to ensure the health of their publics as well as of their
integrated economies.
The North American community’s attention has once again turned to health.
With shocks such as SARS in 2003, the fear of avian influenza in the mid-2000s, and
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the H1N1 outbreak in 2009 occurring more regularly and rapidly bringing more
deaths and economic harm to North America, innovative and coordinated commu-
nity-wide responses have increased (Cooper, Kirton, and Schrecker, 2007; Cooper
and Kirton, 2009). These shocks have forced the NAFTA countries to overcome their
deep desire, legally entrenched in the free trade agreement, to deal with health in
an autonomous –indeed autarchic– way. These old desires have been overcome or
pushed aside as the new challenges have compelled the countries to act more col-
laboratively than before. The old reluctance has been trumped by the fears aroused
by these new, more frequent shared health shocks. This recent shift in North
American health governance could indicate that a broader and more coordinated
approach to health –one that does not only include issues that transcend borders–
might develop in future years.
DOMESTIC DIFFERENCES ON PUBLIC HEALTH
Healthcare systems, structure, quality, and expectations differ a great deal among
the three North American countries and their citizens (Ruelas, 2002). The total ex-
penditure on health care as a percentage of GDP for 2007 in each country was as fol-
lows: Mexico 5.9 percent, the United States 16.0 percent, and Canada 10.1 percent.
The public sector is the main source of health funding for Canada, but not for the
U.S. or Mexico (OECD, 2009). The probability of dying under the age of five is 35 per
1000 live births in Mexico, 8 in the U.S., and 6 in Canada (WHO, 2008a, 2008b, and
2008c). Each country has developed its own unique system to deal with health. Each
has different health outcomes, satisfaction, and rates of success.
These domestically embedded differences were deliberately legally entrenched
in NAFTA. The agreement contained direct legal guarantees that national sovereignty on
health issues would remain intact. It signalled that no trilateral cooperation or con-
vergence was needed or desired in this field. Five chapters in the agreement (11, 12, 14,
16, and 27) relate to health. Chapter 11, Article 1 states, “Nothing in this Chapter shall
be construed to prevent a Party fromproviding a service or performing a function such as
law enforcement, correctional services, income security or insurance, social security
or insurance, social welfare, public education, public training, health, and child care, in
a manner that is not inconsistent with this Chapter” (NAFTA, 1994). Indeed, all the ref-
erences made to health guaranteed complete national autonomy and restricted region-
al convergence on health, not supporting or encouraging cooperation in any way.
Despite this “hard law” prescription for non-cooperation, ongoing concern and
debate have centered on how NAFTA’s trade, investment, environmental, and labor
provisions could positively or negatively affect human health (EPA, 2009). At the
outset, some thought that NAFTA could bring opportunities in health (Poole, 1996).
Administrators and policy makers hoped that the new relationship might encour-
age reforms in Mexico and the U.S. –that the two southern neighbours would learn
and see the benefits of the successful public healthcare system in Canada.
In Canada, however, some worried about the threats that NAFTA posed to their
highly valued public healthcare system (Gray, 1996). They were concerned that the
new relationship would allow or encourage the U.S. privatized approaches to spill
over the northern border. Canada’s healthcare system could be challenged under
the rules of NAFTA (Canadian Union of Public Employees, 2000). With provincial
governments tolerating and even funding private, for-profit medicine, such a chal-
lenge would likely arise. Similar concerns arose in Mexico, where there was fear
that U.S. firms might open clinics that would contract physicians’ services. Some
observed that Mexican medical associations became more active after NAFTA due to
physicians’ concern that U.S. health insurance firms and private hospitals that entered
Mexico would exploit them (Homedes and Ugalde, 2003).
In the U.S., environmental groups were adamant that the new NAFTA must
uphold the existing domestic health laws and regulations. The protection of the
environment and human health, particularly in the areas of industry and agricul-
ture, were of great concern (VanderMeer, 1993). Americans feared that the much
less rigorous policies and enforcement in place across the southern border, particu-
larly in the areas of health and the environment, might drag down the United
States’ high standards and adversely affect Americans’ health.
Under NAFTA’s legal and institutional architecture, national autonomy in health
thus largely prevailed for many years. In each of the three countries –each concerned
that the agreement would harm, not help, their distinct and cherished national
health systems– national autonomy and autarky were more entrenched than region-
al cooperation in the NAFTA regime. The only exceptions were where health was
integrally linked to environmental and labor issues. In these two fields, NAFTA’s
regime created, from nowhere, the potential for cooperation and community in the
form of two new regional organizations: the Commission for Economic Cooper-
ation (CEC) and the Commission for Labor Cooperation (CLC) (Kirton, 2006).
THE NAFTA ERA EVOLUTION
From the outset, any trilateral intergovernmental action that did take place on health
was largely related to the environment and labor, areas where the NAFTA regime had
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created new legal mandates and institutions to identify and act on the links. In both
the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) and the
NorthAmericanAgreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), health was included. In
the NAAEC, under Article 45, environmental law is defined as “any statute or regu-
lation of a Party, or provision thereof, the primary purpose of which is the protec-
tion of the environment, or the prevention of a danger to human life or health”
(NAAEC, 1993). The language clearly states that human health is an integral part of the
environment. The importance of occupational safety and health is also stipulated
throughout the NAALC.
Health continued to be identified within these frameworks as the new North
American institutions got down to work. In the NAFTA environmental provisions,
the countries stated that they would “conditionally protect a party’s stricter envi-
ronmental, health, and safety standards for products and produce (provided that,
among other things, such measures are scientifically based)” (Tiemann, 2000). Sim-
ilarly, the bilateral U.S.-Mexico Border XXI Program, based on the La Paz Agreement,
sought “to achieve a clean environment, protect public health and natural resources,
and encourage sustainable development” in the border region (EPA, 1996). Under the
program, health and environmental agencies in the U.S. and Mexico worked to im-
prove both health and the environment.
In 1996, the U.S. and Mexico took a further step together. They established a
bilateral working group on health to deal with immunization, women’s health, aging,
epidemiological surveillance, migrant health, and addictions. The group continued
to work on these issues in different forums through the years. Similar groups arose
in Canada and the United States. They were largely bilateral, not trilateral, howev-
er. On other issues, such as intellectual property rights, they were global, not conti-
nental (Clarkson, 2007).
The CEC provided a nest for trilateral health cooperation and convergence. In
October 1996, the North American Working Group on the Sound Management of
Chemicals held hearings in Mexico to discuss the elimination of mercury, poly-
chlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT), and chlordane
from the North American environment. DDT, which was widely used in Mexico
to control malaria and exported from there to Colombia, Panama, and Guatemala, was
harming both the environment and the health of citizens in other parts of North
America (Wiehoff, 1996).
The legally weaker CLC served as a less prominent nest, especially in the face of
domestic resistance to cooperation. In Canada, concerns existed that free trade would
reduce standards andworking conditions in order to compete with the lower wages in
the southern United States, where there were fewer unions (Wiehoff, 1996). In 1995,
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after the Canadian government slashed transfer payments to the province of Ontar-
io, workers protested because welfare programs were cut, hospitals were closed, and
healthcare workers were laid off.
In 2002, eight years after NAFTA and the NAALC entered into force, the NAFTA Tri-
National Occupational Safety andHealthWorking Groupwas established to improve
working conditions and living standards of workers by, inter alia, promoting safety
and health. It is difficult to determine if the creation of this group was in any way
a direct response to the 2001 anthrax threats (see below), or even a response to the
countries’ desire to work together more closely after their experience with the Global
Health Security Initiative (GHSI). But it nonetheless gave them another –now trilat-
eral– venue to work on health.
Outside the two NAFTA-related nests, trilateral cooperation came more slowly.
It first emerged in 1998, four years after NAFTA took legal effect. The catalyst was the
infectious disease of HIV/AIDS. On the sidelines of the 1996 International AIDS Con-
ference, the health ministers from the three countries signed a joint declaration to
help people living with HIV (Daniels et al., 1998). Over time, the three countries met
to address health more frequently, often on the margins of other events. But it was
not until the 2000s, after the first of successive health shocks, that their cooperative
partnership emerged in any sustained way.
THE RESPONSE TO THE ANTHRAX SHOCK
Shortly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the U.S. came under another
assault, this time of a biological kind. Letters laced with a substance later identified
as anthrax harmed and killed American civilians. This incident was eventually
labelled “the worst biological attacks in U.S. history” (FBI, 2008). More of a terrorist
shock than a health one, it engendered several responses that had a significant
impact on how health would be governed in the region.
Although relatively few individuals were infected by the anthrax attacks –only
five Americans died and an additional 17 fell ill– the resulting fears and security
concerns were substantial, given that the attacks came so close in time and space to
the September 11 assault (Garrett, 2005). The shock signalled the need for a new
type of health governance, this time in the frame of political security (Price-Smith
and Huang, 2009). Soon after the attacks, U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Ser-
vices Tommy Thompson recommended that countries fighting bioterrorism share
information and coordinate efforts to improve global health security (GHSI, 2010a).
In response, the GHSI was launched in November 2001, bringing together the mem-
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bers of the Group of Seven (G7) and Mexico, to serve as an “informal, international
partnership among like-minded countries to strengthen health preparedness and
response globally to threats of chemical, biological, radio-nuclear terrorism (CBRN)
and pandemic influenza” (GHSI, 2010b). The United States’ northern neighbor,
Canada, agreed to host the first meeting, at which there was a strong emphasis on
bioterrorism. Mexico hosted the third GHSI meeting in December 2002. Here, the
agenda focused not only on bioterrorism, but also on pandemic preparedness (GHSI,
2001 and 2002). The three countries’ health ministers or their representatives, such
as the deputy ministers, began to meet more and more frequently at a number of
such broader gatherings. They did so most notably at the GHSI, which continues to
meet at least once a year.
THE SARS SHOCK AND RESPONSE, 2003
In February 2003, the second shock hit North America when the first case of SARS
was reported in Canada. Over the next several months, more than 400 cases were
reported in Canada, fewer than the 30 in the U.S., and none in Mexico. Only in
Canada did people die as a result. On the whole, Canada bore the brunt of the eco-
nomic side effects of SARS among the NAFTA countries (Price-Smith and Huang, 2009;
Price-Smith, 2009).
However, as is often the case with such acute outbreak events in global health,
it was the fear and apprehension aroused by SARS that brought coordination and
cooperation to North America and across the globe (Kirton, 2009). That panic, both
within infected areas and in uninfected populations, quickly resulted in economic
damage (Price-Smith and Huang, 2009). “Preparedness” and “coordination” were
also required for an effective response, something that had been lacking until then.
The countries hit with SARS largely felt that their domestic systems were inadequate
(Bennett, 2009). They thus needed and wanted one another’s help, realizing it was
no longer desirable, acceptable, or doable on their own. When Paul Martin was ap-
pointed Canada’s prime minister in late 2003, he declared that he was “deter-
mined that Canada would never again be caught unprepared in [such] a crisis”
(Martin, 2008).
SARS brought some immediate changes. In August 2003, Canada hosted an
international technical workshop on regulatory issues associated with developing
vaccines and immunotherapy products for SARS (Gorman, 2004). In November, at
the fourth GHSI ministerial, members shared their lessons from SARS (GHSI, 2003). In
February 2004, once Martin had taken office in Canada, trilateral efforts came. The
more general, multi-subject Trilateral Cooperation Charter was concluded to “pro-
tect and promote public health” and to “increase communication, collaboration,
and the exchange of information among the three countries in the areas of drugs,
biologics, medical devices, food safety, and nutrition to protect and promote human
health” (Health Canada, 2005). This trilateral cooperation made noteworthy efforts
in several fields, including the fight against fraudulent weight-loss products in 2005
and fraudulent diabetes cures in October 2006.
More importantly, SARS catalyzed a shift in health collaboration at the global,
regional, and domestic levels. It provided a clear case of the future challenges countries
needed to be prepared for. Following the outbreak, the demand for more cooperative
and coordinated efforts led to the development of a global pandemic preparedness
plan. Such cooperation began at the fifth GHSI meeting in Paris in 2004 and contin-
ued in 2005 at an international conference of health ministers from 30 countries that
Canada, the U.S., and Mexico participated in (Bennett, 2009).
AVIAN INFLUENZA AND THE ADVENT
OF NORTH AMERICAN SUMMITRY, 2005
Also at the December 2004 GHSI ministerial, those present recognized recent concerns
about a possible avian influenza pandemic. They announced their commitment to
work with the WHO on pandemic influenza preparedness and acknowledged the
importance of enhancing surveillance and outbreak response activities (GHSI, 2004).
The following year, in 2005, North American summitry began on a stand-alone
basis in the form of the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP)
(Ackleson and Kastner, 2006; Clarkson, 2006 and 2008; Rozental 2006). The SPP was
created because the leaders of the three countries wanted something that went above
and beyond the partial, silo system of the NAFTA institutional architecture (Martin,
2008; CEC, 1997; McKinney, 2000; Anderson and Sands, 2007). The summit provided
an opportunity to discuss numerous issues, including ones that were a core part of
the NAFTA framework from the beginning, such as trade. But it has also been used to
address issues, such as health, where there was not only no dedicated institutional nest
but also a great reluctance to engage in trilateral cooperation in virtually any form.
The advent of SPP summitry in 2005 marked a major change. In Waco, Texas, at
their first meeting, the three leaders made two commitments on health: to “improve
productivity through regulatory cooperation to generate growth, while maintain-
ing high standards for health and safety,” and to “enhance the stewardship of our
environment, create a safer and more reliable food supply while facilitating agri-
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cultural trade, and protect our people from disease” (SPP, 2005). The first promise
placed health directly in the context of regulatory cooperation. The second mandat-
ed the direct protection of human health as a common value along with environ-
mental enhancement and food safety.
At the second summit in Cancún, Mexico, in March 2006, held just after the eco-
logical shock of a major hurricane had struck the resort, attention to health grew and
became the object of regulatory cooperation in its own right. The leaders declared,
The SPP provides a framework for us to advance collaboration in areas as diverse as secu-
rity, transportation, the environment, and public health.…We are convinced that regula-
tory cooperation advances the productivity and competitiveness of our nations and
helps to protect our health, safety, and environment. (SPP, 2006)
The leaders further moved proactively and preventively, mandating a major
program of cooperation on avian and human influenza. A section of their joint
statement, titled “Avian and Human Pandemic Influenza,” declared,
Given the highly integrated nature of our economies, an outbreak of pathogenic avian
flu or human pandemic influenza in any one of our countries would affect us all.…We
have endorsed a set of shared principles to underpin cooperative activities by our
Governments in all stages of avian influenza and human pandemic influenza manage-
ment: prevention; preparedness; response; and recovery. Pursuant to these principles,
officials will develop, as an immediate priority, incident management protocols to ensure
that we are well prepared in advance of an outbreak in North America. (SPP, 2006)
This move on pandemic preparedness was not surprising. Following the first
SPP summit, at the September 2005 United Nations General Assembly there was a
renewed commitment to collaborate on preventing an influenza pandemic. U.S. Pres-
ident George W. Bush announced the establishment of the International Partner-
ship onAvian and Pandemic Influenza. Also, after returning from a November 2005
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Korea, Canadian Prime Min-
ister Paul Martin, with the experience of SARS still fresh in his mind, was alarmed to
hear how Asian countries were dealing with the issue of avian influenza –by sim-
ply doing nothing and allowing infected poultry to be sold. He requested that
Canada convene a ministerial meeting to “ensure that the concerns of the world’s
leaders were conveyed to the World Health Organization” (Martin, 2008). In 2006
the health ministers of the Group of Eight (G8) met for the first time ever and invit-
ed Mexico to join them, thus creating another opportunity to discuss this issue.
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The North American leaders (all members of APEC) thus moved from a reactive
discussion to a proactive approach to a third shock that was rising in Asia and had
not –but could– strike NorthAmerica. They developed regional governance in pub-
lic health, through trilateral institutionalization from the top. They were supported
by other, more global bodies.
The three countries largely complied with their SPP public health commit-
ments from 2006. In August 2007 the North American pandemic plan was released
(SPP, 2007b). It outlined how Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. would work together to
combat an outbreak of avian influenza or an influenza pandemic in North Amer-
ica. The plan complemented national emergency management plans. It built upon
the core principles of the International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic In-
fluenza, the standards and guidelines of the World Organization for Animal Health
and the WHO guidelines, including the revised International Health Regulations and
the rules and provisions of NAFTA and the World Trade Organization. While it thus
reinforced broader efforts, the plan made clear that regional cooperation and con-
vergence in health were required, since multilateralism was not enough to protect
vulnerable North Americans from the particular threats they faced from abroad.
At the 2007 SPP summit in Montebello, Quebec, the leaders’ attention to and
action on health increased again. The summit agenda broadened substantially, with
the old subject of health in general, and avian and pandemic influenza in particu-
lar, now joined by many newcomers: chemicals, automotive emissions, energy use,
intellectual property, border screening, and indigenous health issues (including sui-
cide prevention, fetal alcohol spectrum disorder, diabetes, and indigenous health sys-
tems). Health became a pervasive, crosscutting value and concern. It had grown from
a general topic, through a specific concern with high-profile diseases, to embrace sev-
eral specific industrial sectors and instruments, security, chronic diseases, and health
systems as a whole.
Montebello also marked a major normative advance. Health was no longer
framed only within a biomedical model (disease protection) or as an economic deter-
minant (the connection between health and trade, agriculture, or food). Monte-
bello added the securitization of health in the form of border screening. Although
it did not suggest health was a human right, it moved tentatively into the domain
of redistribution and equity by emphasizing the need to protect the health of par-
ticularly vulnerable and dispossessed groups (for example, indigenous health).
The leaders again called for regulatory cooperation on health, now due to the
competitive pressures on North America from abroad. The section titled “Enhancing
the Global Competitiveness of North America” stated that “in this highly competi-
tive environment, compatible regulations and standards enable us to protect health,
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safety, and the environment, as well as to facilitate trade in goods and services across
our borders” (SPP, 2007a). A new principle of regional regulatory health cooperation
for global competitiveness was thus produced.
In the realm of commitments, the leaders noted that their three countries had
completed a North American Plan for Avian and Pandemic Influenza, a Regulatory
Cooperation Framework, and an Intellectual Property Action Strategy. The latter
sought to avoid negative impacts on health while developing collaborative mea-
sures to improve the detection and deterrence of counterfeiting and piracy, expanding
public awareness of the importance of intellectual property to the three economies
and for consumer health and safety, and measuring the scope and magnitude of
counterfeiting and piracy in North America more effectively, as well as developing
best practices for enforcement and sharing information and intelligence on border
enforcement techniques.
In the section titled “Protecting Our Environment, Health and Quality of Life,”
the leaders reported that in order to “raise the health status of indigenous people”
their countries had exchanged information and research on various health issues,
“including suicide prevention, Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder, diabetes, and indi-
genous health systems” (SPP, 2007a). The joint statement also declared that Mexico
had started a program to increase the supply of low-sulphur fuels in the country to
“protect the environment, enhance health of people and promote the competitive-
ness of the automotive industry.” The proactive desire to improve human health
thus led to trilateral regulatory convergence in the automotive, energy, and envi-
ronmental areas. It also extended to border issues: the section on “Smart and Secure
Borders” stated a desire to develop “mutually acceptable approaches to screening
people during a pandemic.”
The summit’s top-down development of regional health governance now
reached into the ministerial domain. The statement noted, “Our ministers of industry
and commerce, foreign affairs, security, environment, energy, health, transportation,
and trade have also met in recent months, reflecting our deepening dialogue with-
in North America” (SPP, 2007a). The health shock from Asia, in the form of tainted
toothpaste and food from China, probably propelled these moves.
In 2008, when the leaders met at another site still recovering from the devasta-
tion of a recent hurricane –New Orleans– they again dealt with health, if less so
than in the two previous years. This suggested that Mexico and Canada as hosts,
more than George W. Bush’s United States, were driving summit action on health.
The joint statement declared an intention “to implement compatible fuel efficiency
regimes and high safety standards to protect human health and the environment,
and to reduce the costs of producing cars and trucks for the North American mar-
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ket”. It added, “To improve our citizens’ access to safe food, and health and con-
sumer products in North America, we are increasing cooperation and information
sharing on the safety of food and products” (SPP, 2008). With the fear of avian in-
fluenza waning, autos, energy, and food were the three health subjects of concern.
The countries were now using high standards and improved access for health
ambitiously through compatible regimes on auto and fuels, and less far-reaching
cooperation and information sharing on food and product safety. This new agenda
and its principles were likely driven by three shocks hitting a more equally vulner-
able North America from overseas. The first was lead poisoning in toys (as well as
questionable milk products) from China. The second was rising food prices around
the world. The third was the historically high price of North American oil and gas
in the summer of 2008.
THE SWINE FLU SHOCK, 2009
Influenza A(H1N1) broke out in April 2009. From the outset, it was clearly seen as
a major North American problem. On April 24, the U.S. and Mexico simultaneously
reported cases. That same day, the WHO commended the U.S. and Mexico for their
proactive reporting and for their collaboration on the matter. The WHO declared that it
would work with the health authorities in the NAFTA countries in order to better un-
derstand the risks of H1N1 (WHO, 2009a). A mere three days later, the outbreak had
spread to the third NAFTAmember: onApril 27, all three NAFTA partners reported cases
of H1N1, with 40 cases confirmed in the U.S., 6 in Canada and 26 in Mexico, where
7 people had already died as a result (WHO, 2009b). By May 1, H1N1 had gone global,
with 13 countries reporting cases. But it was still NorthAmerica that was the cause for
most concern. Of the 367 reported cases, 90 percent were in North America. All 10
deaths that had resulted had occurred in Mexico and the United States (WHO, 2009c).
North American citizens paid close attention to H1N1. In a poll conducted in
the United States on April 29, 2009, 73 percent of respondents said they were fol-
lowing swine flu news closely or somewhat closely; 44 percent said they were con-
cerned that they or someone in their immediate family would contract the
influenza within the year; 25 percent said that they had avoided places where large
numbers of people gather; 59 percent said they were washing their hands or using
hand sanitizer more often (Harvard School of Public Health, 2009).
By early July, the shock had escalated immensely. The number of H1N1 cases
reported in NorthAmerica reached 52 147 (more than half the total number of cases
worldwide) (WHO, 2009d). There were 7 983 cases in Canada, 10 262 in Mexico, and
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33 902 in the United States. The total number of H1N1 deaths in NorthAmerica was
314 (almost three-quarters of the total worldwide): 25 in Canada, 119 in Mexico and
170 in the United States. In response to the escalating pandemic, Mexico hosted an
international meeting on H1N1 at the beginning of July. All three North America
ministers of health attended, along with Margaret Chan, the director general of the
WHO. Once again, the WHO commended Canada, Mexico, and the United States on
their coordination and leadership. Chan stated that the “WHO and the international
community have much to thank these three countries for setting a precedent that,
up to now, nearly every country has followed” (2009).
A poll at the end of July indicated that Canadians and Americans were still
paying close attention to news related to swine flu (70 percent in Canada and 75
percent in the United States) (Angus Reid Strategies, 2009). It found that 42 percent
of Canadians and 52 percent of Americans (slightly more than in April) were wor-
ried about personally contracting swine flu. Fifty-five percent of Canadian respon-
dents and 59 percent of American respondents were worried about a friend or
family member being infected. Both groups, however, were satisfied with the way
their respective governments were responding to the H1N1 pandemic: 71 percent
of Canadians said theywere very ormoderately satisfied, and 68 percent ofAmericans
agreed that their government was taking the necessary approach. In contrast, in the
United Kingdom, only 52 percent of respondents were very or moderately satisfied
with their government’s response. Within North America, the immediate intense
trilateral cooperation had thus secured strong societal support.
On August 6, the WHO (2009f) reported that there were 102 905 (out of a total
177 457) confirmed cases in the Americas and that 1 274 of the 1 462 deaths had
occurred in the region.1 It was an obvious cause for concern and discussion when
NAFTA leaders met in Guadalajara three days later for their now renamed North
American Leaders’ Summit (NALS).
Health was indeed one of the major themes discussed at this summit. By mid-
July, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had announced that the leaders would
discuss it as well as security, economic, and trade policy and regional challenges at
their meet (Kellerhale, 2009). But it was health and the environment that dominat-
ed their agenda at Guadalajara, with separate declarations on each (NALS, 2009b and
2009c). At the end of the summit, Obama underscored the three countries’ willing-
ness and need to cooperate on the matter: “In response to the H1N1 pandemic, our
three governments have worked closely, collaboratively, and responsibly. With sci-
1 By the end of July, the WHO had stopped reporting the breakdown of H1N1 by country and moved to
regional updates (2009d, 2009f, and 2010).
ence as our guide, we resolved to continue taking all necessary preparations and
precautions to prepare for the upcoming flu season and protect the health of our
people. And this challenge transcends borders, and so must our response” (White
House, 2009).
The declaration on H1N1 affirmed the strong trilateral connection among the
three countries. And in concluding, the three leaders identified the benefit and
importance of working together: “We know that cooperation and communication
between nations, governments, citizens, and domestic and international organiza-
tions are the most effective ways to ensure that we are all protected. The strong col-
laboration between our countries allowed us to have a more secure North America
region” (NALS, 2009c).
Cooperation and convergence on health were thus highlighted at Obama’s first
North American summit. The three countries have engaged in self-congratulation,
but their efforts have also been commended by the global community. Health re-
ceived a huge amount of attention, with all three countries acknowledging the need
to collaborate in the face of H1N1. All three were hit hard by the pandemic and,
with no clear end in sight, the leaders correctly identified that, by working togeth-
er, they would be much better off than if they were to forge ahead alone.
This collaboration continued after the August 2009 summit. The GHSI held a
special ministerial meeting on H1N1 September 10 and 11, before gathering again
to discuss the issue at their annual meet in December. As with the previous North
American health shocks, the GHSI once again brought together individuals from the
North American community and beyond to deliberate and coordinate on this health
crisis (GHSI, 2009). Moreover, the new process for implementing the leaders’ agree-
ments at their trilateral summits meant that North America’s health ministers would
engage trilaterally in a regular, leader-guided way, at least in the near future. By
November, 63 percent of Americans were still concerned that they or someone they
knew would be infected, and 65 percent thought the Obama administration was
doing everything it could to address the issue (Ipsos News Centre, 2009). Societal
support for the trilateral response thus remained strong.
CONCLUSIONS
The shocks that highlighted the vulnerabilities of the three NorthAmerican countries,
reinforced by economic and security concerns, and the establishment of NorthAmer-
ican summitry played a role in moving North American cooperation on health for-
ward (Kirton, 2007; Boin et al., 2005). Thus, the countries seem both able and willing
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to cooperate on crisis health issues. However, the impact of these same factors on
health challenges that do not transcend borders or that do not arise in a “shocking”
fashion is less clear. For example, it is unclear whether recent trends toward region-
al cooperation have led to more cooperation on other issues such as U.S. healthcare
reform, as might have been expected. Despite the desire by manyAmericans to have
a healthcare system more closely resembling Canada’s and Obama’s recent push to
reform the healthcare system, resistance remains (Blendon and Taylor, 1989; Blendon
et al., 1990; Donelan et al., 1999; PollingReport, 2009). On areas such as food safety
and indigenous health, the degree to which the three countries work together also
remains limited. Challenges, such as food products that could be harmful to human
health, like tomatoes carrying salmonella fromMexico or cattle with BSE fromAlber-
ta, could continue to result in less NorthAmerican cooperation, not more. Summitry
without shocks and the societal support they bring can only do so much.
However, recent health shocks like SARS and swine flu have led Canada, Mex-
ico, and the United States to collaborate and coordinate increasingly on health. The
three countries haveworked together successfully to tackle the challenges. TheNorth
American governments have responded to these challenges and in doing so have
recognized that going it alone on certain issues is no longer desirable. By working
together first on areas where collaboration has been necessary, the North American
partners may still be able to break down some of the negative perceptions that have
plagued the issue of health from NAFTA’s outset. Thus, even though action by the
three countries on health governance has not broadened as much as their agenda
has, they will be able to cooperate more easily when the right opportunity comes.
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